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Automobiles-Turning and Stopping-Signals by Driver
A truck, operated by defendant company, and a motorcycle, driven
by plaintiff's intestate, were proceeding in the same direction on a city
street, the motorcycle following the truck. The truck driver, without
looking in his rear view mirror, made a hand signal for a left turn which
it appears was not continued for the last fifty feet traveled; and then
"angled" left towkrd the driveway entrance to defendant's plant. The
motorcycle struck the left side of the truck near the front when the
truck was several feet from the entrance to the driveway, causing the
death of the motorcycle driver. Motion to nonsuit plaintiff denied.
Verdict for plaintiff. Held, in Ervin v. Cannon Millsl trial court's ruling affirmed.
This decision focuses attention on the issues inherent in motor vehicle
accidents growing out of turning and stopping without adequate signal.
The ordinary situation is one in which the vehicle turning or stopping is
hit from the rear by the vehicle immediately following. N. C. GEN STAT.
§20-154 states the important rules for signals upon stopping or turning.2
The driver following has the advantage of the rule that its violation is
negligence per se.3 Therefore a showing of violation of the statute
coupled with proof of causal connection between the violation and the
injury establishes actionable negligence. 4 Hence if it is admitted that
defendant violated the statute-which led to the accident-his chances
of winning depend on a showing of contributory negligence.
On the other hand, the person who is charged with negligent
stopping or turning has the benefit of N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-152, which
'233 N. C. 415 (1951).
- "(a) The driver of any vehicle upon a highway before starting,
stopping or
turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in
safety, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such
movement, shall give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to the
driver of such other vehicle, of the intention to make such a movement.
"(b) The signal herein required shall 'begiven by means of the hand and arm
in the manner specified, or by any mechanical or electrical signal device approved
by the department, except that when a vehicle is so constructed or loaded as to
prevent the hand and arm signal from being visible, both to the front and rear, the
signal shall be given by a device of a type which has been approved by the department.
"Whenever the signal is given the driver shall indicate his intention to start,
stop or turn by extending the hand and arm from and beyond the left side of the
vehicle as hereinafter set forth.
"All signals to be given from left side of vehicle during last fifty feet traveled."
N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-154 (1949 Supp.).
For the rules on the technique of making a turn, see N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-153
(1943).
Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950) ; Conley v. Pearce Young-Angel Co.,
224 N. C. 211, 29 S.E. 2d 740 (1944) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E.
2d 311 (1939).
'Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 365 (1942)
Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950).
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declares that "(a) The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another
vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent with regard to the
safety of others and due regard to the speed of such vehicles and the
traffic upon and the condition of the highway... ."G Its violation also
constitutes negligence per se. 6 The turning driver may also rely on the
statutory duty of a passer to sound his horn,7 if not within a business
or residential district, the breach of which is "negligence." 8
Although N. C. GEN STAT. §20-154 is stated in terms of an absolute
twofold duty (1) to turn only after driver has first seen that the movement can be made in safety, (2) to give the proper signal whenever
the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement;
yet it has been construed to require only the exercise of reasonable care
to see if movement can be safely made, and to require the giving of a
signal only when "surrounding circumstances afford him reasonable
grounds for apprehending that his turn ...might affect the operation
of another vehicle." 9 Hence the law does not require a driver to signal
every time he turns, nor &ioesit demand infallibility of his judgment of
the proper occasion to signal. The most extreme application of this view
is in Stovall v. Ragland.o There plaintiff turned left from the highway into his private driveway-1 without giving a signal of any description and collided with defendant who was apparently in the act of passing him. Plaintiff was held to have satisfied the statutory duty by his act
of looking in his rear view mirror. Accordingly the court held that the
trial judge erred in calling plaintiff's conduct negligent as a matter of
law on a motion to nonsuit him. The result of this decision and the
interpretation of the statute may be to deprive the statute of much of
its precautionary value. As a practical matter the effort required to give
a signal in every case as an alternative to current dependence on the
driver's "reasonable" decision in each case as to when one is necessary,
'Subsection (b) of this statute
traveling upon a highway outside
follow another motor truck within
strued to prevent one motor truck

states: "The driver of any motor truck, when
of a business or residence district, shall not
three hundred feet, but this shall not be confrom overtaking and passing another." N. C.

GEx. STAT. §20-152 (1949 Supp.).

"Murray v. A. C. L. R. R., 218 N. C. 392. 11 S. E. 2d 326 (1940).
N. C. GEIT. STAT. §20-149 (1943), relied on in Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C.
536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937) ; held inapplicable in the Ervin v. Cannon Mills case
because in business district.
8 Stovall v. Ragland, 211 N. C. 536, 190 S.E. 899 (1937).
' Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 536, 58 S. E. 2d 115, 117, (1950).
10211 N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 2d 899 (1937). "The plaintiff having looked in
both directions and having observed no automobile or other vehicle approaching
from either direction, was under no obligation, by virtue of the statute, to give
any signal of his -purpose to turn to the left and enter the driveway of his home."
(p.1539)
7

' It would seem that greater precaution should be exercised by the driver
turning into a private driveway than at an intersection where turning is more to
be expected.
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is slight compared to the number of accidents it would prevent. Some
decisions of the North Carolina court, however, indicate that this
statutory duty may not be so flexible as it might seem.' 2 It has been
said that "He [the driver] is held to the duty of seeing what he ought
to have seen."'38
The principal case (Ervin v. Cannon Mills) in which the driver following was suing the driver turning, seems to impose a more stringent
duty on the turning driver than Stovall v. Ragaknd,'4 in which the
driver turning was suing the driver following. In the Ervin case a signal
was admittedly given, although the court was somewhat doubtful
whether it complied with the 50 feet requirement of N. C. GEN. STAT.
§20-154, and the court emphasized that in addition the turning triver
had not ascertained whether the turn could be made in safety by looking
in his rear view mirror. But even assuming proper giving of a signal
the court declares that compliance with the minimum requirements of the
statute is not necessarily an exercise of the ordinary care of the reasonable prudent man under the circumstances-which is the ultimate
criterion. In the Stovall -decision the court seemed eager to hold that
the turning driver's conduct could be found to have complied with the
statute without making any inquiry into a more extensive duty. However, since the court did not hold the turning driver free of negligence
as a matter of law, there is no conflict in the cases. The court seems to
feel that such a flexible formula is a necessary concomitant to variable
facts.
The application of these rules to an accident caused by the sudden
stopping of a preceding vehicle which is hit in the rear by the vehicle
following raises similar principles.' 5 The mere stopping on a highway
without a signal is not negligence. Even though a stop signal is not
given, the jury may still be allowed to decide whether the conduct was
negligent. 6 Holland v. Strader14 presented the familiar autumn scene
of a long string of closely following automobiles proceeding to a football game at Chapel Hill, intermittently slowing and increasing speed.
The defendant was forced to stop because of the stopping of the automobiles ahead of him, and he did so suddenly and without a signal.
On this showing, plaintiff, who smashed into the rear of defendant's car,
was allowed to go to the jury.
The usual view of the North Carolina court is that the jury should
decide these uncertain questions of negligence and contributory negliE. g., emphasis in Ervin decision on compliance plus.
"Wall v. Bain, 222 N. C. 375, 379, 23 S. E. 2d 330, 333 (1942).
214211 N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937).
"

" Conley v. Pearce Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. 2d 740 (1944).
" See cases cited note 18 infra.

2216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939).
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gence regardless of which driver, following or preceding, is the plaintiff.
Thus a finding of no original negligence of defendent or of contributory
negligence as a matter of law in these turning or stopping accidents is
8
ordinarily not proper.
A limited number of decisions, however, have granted nonsuit1 0 or
21
20
sustained a demurrer in cases involving both turning and stopping.
in all of these the ruling was in favor of the turning or stopping driver.
In reaching such a decision, reliance is placed upon one or more of
three factors.
(1) The following driver was guilty of conduct which was a breach
of some of the duties imposed upon him; viz. in following too closely,
failing to sound horn before passing, exceeding proper speed.2 2
(2) The turning or stopping driver may assume that the following
driver will obey these traffic rules and will exercise due care for the
safety of others. 23 This right is qualified, 24 however, and the court
has stated that a driver may so rely only when he himself is free of
negligence.
(3) The court may invoke the "outrunning the headlights" doc"Turning: Grimm v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950); Levy v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 232 N. C. 158, 59 S. E. 2d 632 (1950) ; Beaman v. Duncan, 228 N. C.
600, 46 S. E. 2d 707 (1948); Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C.
390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942) (bicycle treated for these purposes as vehicle; here
bicycle was turning); Mason v. Johnston, 215 N. C. 95, 1 S. E. 2d 379 (1939)
(court said in passing that nonsuit properly refused); Stovall v. Ragland, 211
N. C. 536, 190 S. E. 899 (1937); Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co., 208
N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935).
Stopping: Banks v. Shepard, 230 N. C. 86, 52 S. E. 2d 215 (1949); Barlow
v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1948); Conley v. Pearce
Young-Angel Co., 224 N. C. 211, 29 S. E. 2d 740 (1944) ; Bechtler v. Bracken,
218 N. C. 515, 11 S. E. 2d 721 (1940) (new trial given plaintiff against whom
verdict rendered) ; Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939);
Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938).
" The usual rules as to granting of nonsuit on ground of contributory negligence are: (1) nonsuit will not be sustained or directed unless the evidence is
so clear that no other conclusion seems permissible; (2) the evidence'is taken
in the light most favorable to plaintiff and he is entitled to every reasonable
inference to be drawn therefrom; accordingly only that part of defendant's evidence which is favorable to plaintiff will be considered. Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944), and cases cited there.
But see possible modification of rule (2) in the majority opinion and concurring
opinion of Stacy, C. J., in this case (evidence considered to explain and make
clear plaintiff's evidence, to make manifest natural or physical circumstances which
may bar recovery. Pp. 692-3). The three-member dissent takes issue with the
majority on the evidence to be considered.
. Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) (nonsuit) ; Austin
v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (nonsuit) ; Cooley v. Baker,
231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950) (demurrer to complaint sustained; accident between meeting cars).
"Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d 419 (1949) ; Warner v. Lazarus
229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 2d 496 (1948); Atkins v. White Transportation Co., 224
N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944).
22 Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950).
23 Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950).
24 See Sebastian v. Horton Motor Lines, 213 N. C. 770 (1938).
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trine-which raises a duty to drive at a speed at which the driver can
stop within the range of his headlights, the violation of which is negligence as a matter of law. 25 This rule has been applied by a line of
North Carolina cases to support the nonsuiting of a plaintiff who hits
the rear of a vehicle parked on the highway.2 6 An inquiry whether it
should also be applied to moving vehicles which suddenly stop or turn
without warning is somewhat academic in the face of statements by
27
the court that this line of cases is also controlling as to stopping
and turning.28 The doctrine has undergone a turbulent history,29 and
its present status is made somewhat doubtful by the most recent decision 0 which sent a similar hitting-the-rear-of-a-parked-vehicle situation'
to the jury.
The court has also emphasized that in order to establish contributory
negligence (here as a matter of law) it is not necessary to show that
the plaintiff's negligence was the sole and proximate or "real and efficient" cause, but merely that there was negligence of plaintiff which
concurred with that of defendant to contribute to the injury.3 1 This is
to be contrasted with the rule that in order to insulate negligence of a
defendant, the negligence of the other tortfeasor must be the motivating
or principal negligence which proximately causes the accident and
hence overshadows the defendant's negligence 32 Therefore a showing
of negligence of less serious nature is adequate to support a nonsuit
predicated on contributory negligence.
The cases discussed thus far have involved collision of vehicles proceeding in the same direction but these principles are likewise applicable
to the turning by one vehicle across the path of another vehicle approach33
ing from the opposite direction.
In several cases the sudden turn is made to avoid some obstruction
Note, 27 N. C. L. Rev. 153 (1948).
E.g., Marshall v. Southern Ry., 233 N. C. 38 (1951) ; Cox v. Lee, 230 N. C.
155, 52 S. E. 2d 355 (1949); Tyson v. Ford, 228 N. C. 778, 47 S. E. 2d 251
(1948) ; Beck v. Hooks, 218 N. C. 105 S. E. 2d 608 (1940) ; Weston v. Southern
Ry., 194 N. C. 210, 139 S. E. 237 (1927).
"Fawley v. Bobo, 231 N. C. 203, 56 S. E. 2d 419 (1949) ; Atkins v. White
Transportation Co., 224 N. C. 688, 32 S. E. 2d 209 (1944).
" Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) ; Austin v. Overton,
222 N. C_. 89, 21 S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (plaintiff and defendant disagree whether
driver stopped or turned).
"' A line of cases contra to those cited in note 28 supra has developed. E.g.,
Thomas v. Thurston Motor Lines, 230 N. C. 122, 52 S. E. 2d 377 (1949) ; Cummins v. Southern Fruit Co., 225 N. C. 625, 36 S. E. 2d 11 (1945); Leonard v.
Tatum Transfer Co., 218 N. C. 667, 12 S. E. 2d 729 (1940).
"Chaffin v. Brame, 233 N. C. 377 (1951).
"Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C. 89, 21 S.E. 2d 887 (1942).
" Beaman v. Duncan, 228 N. C. 600, 46 S. E. 2d 707 (1948) ; Powers v. Sternberg & Co., 213 N. C. 41, 195 S. E. 88 (1938).
" Cooley v. Baker, 231 N. C. 533, 58 S. E. 2d 115 (1950), Butner v. Spease,
217 N. C. 82, 6 S. E. 2d 808 (1940) ;

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

in the road ahead.3 4 These were cases in which the court refused to
rule against the party turning, as a matter of law.3 5 The court, then,
may take notice that an emergency was created30 and hence hold the
driver only to the standard of care commensurate with the emergency
circumstances. 37 Indeed one faced with the choice between instantly
turning or striking the object ahead should perhaps not be charged with
the ordinary presence of mind requiring the giving of a signal. However, it has been declared that the principle is not available to one who
by his own negligence has brought about or contributed to the
emergency.3 8
Just as the court favors submitting issues of negligence of defendant
to the jury, it may also be held error to fail to submit the issue of contributory negligence of plaintiff to the jury.3 9
Even though a plaintiff who turns without a signal is shown to be
guilty of contributory negligence yet he may win on an issue of last
40
clear chance.
To what extent are modern mechanical and electrical devices on the
rear and front of vehicles, indicating turning and stopping, a compliance
with the driver's duty? N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-154 authorizes not only
a hand signal but also signal by mechanical or electrical devices "approved by the department" (of Motor Vehicles).
Administratively, the practice of the Department of Motor Vehicles
is to approve in blanket form certain devices which have been tested
by the department according to the candle power and size of the light,
frequency of flashing, etc. It is the opinion of the Department of
Motor Vehicles and the Department of Justice that an operator of any
automobile equipped with one of the approved types of devices in good
working order may use it in lieu of the hand signal-at least in regard
to turning. Some doubt has been expressed as to the adequacy of the
rear brake light as a substitute for a hand stop signal since (1) the
light flashes when the brakes are applied which may mean mere slowing
rather than stopping and (2) there is no intermittent flashing and
hence it is less noticeable than a turn indicator.
"4Tarrant v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942)
(opening door of car at side of road); Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co.,

208 N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935) (chicken); Austin v. Overton, 222 N. C.
89, 21
S. E. 2d 887 (1942) (turning driver claims drunk man in the road).
"2 But cf. Holland v. Strader, 216 N. C. 436, 5 S. E. 2d 311 (1939) (stopping
ahead in football traffic).
caused by stopping
"4Tarrant v. Pepsi Cola Co., 221 N. C. 390, 20 S. E. 2d 565 (1942).
27 Sparks v. Willis, 228 N. C. 25, 28, 44 S. E. 2d 343, 344 (1947).
: Hoke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 227 N. C. 412, 42 S. E. 2d 593 (1947).
SMason v. Johnston, 215 N. C. 95, 1 S. E. 2d 379 (1939).
"' Morris v. Seashore Transportation Co., 208 N. C. 807, 182 S. E. 487 (1935).
But cf. Van Dyke v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 218 N. C. 283, 10 S. E. 2d 727
(1940).
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Although there has been no square holding that these devices are
adequate compliance with the driver's statutory duty, yet decisions have
given cognizance to their ability to warn the driver following and put
him on notice.4 1 Hence even though no hand signal is given, it is clear
that the flashing of a directional turn signal on the rear and front of
the vehicle, or the flashing of a red light on the rear when the brakes
are applied, are circumstances which will be considered. In a recent
case 42 in which the operator of a stopping bus relied on the rear brake
lights, the court held that a mere showing that the inspector for the
Utilities Commission had approved the bus and that the bus had the
lighting equipment prescribed by the Commission was not sufficient
evidence of compliance with the above statute.
HUBERT B. HumPHREY, JR.
Conflict of Laws-Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decrees
A recent North Carolina case 1 is typical of the cases which pose
the problems inherent in the methods of enforcing foreign alimony decrees. Plaintiff wife brought action to establish and enforce a Florida
decree directing payment of $100 monthly alimony. The trial court
entered judgment for plaintiff for past due and unpaid installments
accrued, decreed the adoption of the Florida judgment, and thereupon
entered an order directing payment of future installments as they become
due. Held: plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment ordering payment
of future installments, but only to a money judgment for past due and
unpaid installments due her under the decree, "which judgment" the
court added "is enforceable by execution and not by contempt proceedings. The courts are generally in agreement- that a foreign alimony decree
is not enforceable in so far as it relates to future installments.a And as
"'Levy v. Carolina Aluminum Co., 232 N. C. 158, 59 S. E. 2d 632 (1950)
(turning signal) ; Moore v. Boone, 231 N. C. 494, 57 S. E. 2d 783 (1950) (turning
signal); Barlow v. City Bus Lines, 229 N. C. 382, 49 S. E. 2d 793 (1949)
(brake lights); Warner v. Lazarus, 229 N. C. 27, 47 S. E. 496 (1948) (brake
lights; court even raised question of how many feet brake lights were on before
collision); Smith v. Carolina Coach Co., 214 N. C. 314, 199 S. E. 90 (1938) (brake
lights; court let jury decide whether adequate compliance with statute; the then
statute apparently did not contain a provision for electrical signal). But see Grimm
v. Watson, 233 N. C. 65 (1950), where facts indicated electrical turn signal
given, but no mention made of it in court's opinion.
"Banks v. Shepard, 230 N. C. 86, 52 S. E. 2d 215 (1949).

'Willard v. Rodman, 233 N. C. 198, 63 S. E. 2d 106 (1951).
"Id. at p. 202.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause does not obligate the courts of one state to
enforce an alimony decree rendered in another state with regard to future payments, particularly when such future installments are subject to modification by

